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Notes
Gay Rights and Religion: A Doctrinal
Approach to the Argument that AntiGay-Rights Initiatives Violate the
Establishment Clause
by
MARC L. RuBINSTEIN*

Introduction
In a recent letter to a prominent gay rights organization, President Clinton wrote that
[t]hose who would legalize discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or any other grounds are gravely mistaken about the values
that make our nation strong.... This is not an issue of special rights
for any one group.
This is a battle to protect the human rights of
1
every individual.

This Note will discuss the intersection between lesbian, gay, and bisexual2 equal rights and the Establishment Clause of the United States
* J.D. 1995, Hastings College of the Law; B.A. 1991, University of Redlands. I am
grateful to the staff of the Hastings Law Journalfor their efforts in editing this Note, to my
parents, Harold and Bonnie Rubinstein, for their loving support, and to my partner William O'Callaghan for his loving companionship and for encouraging me to pursue this
topic.
1. Passages from the letter are reprinted in Debbie Howlett, Clinton Takes Stand For
Gay Rights, USA TODAY, Feb. 16, 1994, at 2A.
2. This Note will sometimes refer to lesbians, gay men, and bisexual people collectively as "gay" or refer to the "gay rights movement." While the term "queer" would offer
an inclusive and simple one-word term of reference, its use as a synonym for lesbians and
gay men is offensive to some. See David Taller, Gays at Odds Over 'Q-Word' Some Homosexuals Plan Protestof "Year of Queer" Parade Theme, S.F. CHRON., June 7, 1993, at A17.
But see Peter Tatchell, Do Us a Favor-CallUs Queer,THE INDEPENDENT, July 26, 1992, at
22 (discussing the slogan of the New Queer Politics of the 1990s: "We're here! We're
queer! Get used to it!"). The recent controversy over San Francisco's June 1993 Gay Pride
Parade theme, "Year of the Queer," is an example of the difference of opinion over the
term. Id.
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Constitution. 3 Specifically, it will examine whether the current flurry
of anti-gay-rights initiatives4 violates the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment.5 By anti-gay-rights initiatives, this Note means initiatives such as Amendment Two in Colorado 6 and Measure Nine in Or3. The religion clauses of the First Amendment read: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .
U.S.
CONSr. amend. I.
4. Following their narrow defeat in Oregon and buoyed by their popular victory in
Colorado, Bettina Boxall, Oregon Measure Condemning Homosexuals is Trailing, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 4, 1992, at A20, anti-gay-rights forces have mobilized around the country to
roll back the legislative gains of gay rights advocates, and if possible, to preclude future
antidiscrimination legislation from being enacted. See John Gallagher, State of the Union,
THE ADVOC., Nov. 23, 1993, at 46. For example, initiatives similar to the one that passed in
Colorado have been planned for Idaho, Oregon, Arizona, Missouri, Michigan, and Washington. J. Jennings Moss, Gays Battle Right After Voting Losses, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 11,
1994, at A4; see also Peter Eisler, Gays vs. Conservatives FightShifts to Local Front, Gannett News Service, Mar. 29, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File (noting
that at least a dozen new antigay measures surfaced in 1995). Anti-gay-rights initiatives
were, in fact, on the November 1994 ballots in Idaho and Oregon, where they were narrowly defeated. Kevin Merida, Republicans' Showing in Election Renews Gay Rights Debate, WASH. POST, Nov. 25, 1994, at A33. In Oregon, however, the Oregon Citizen's
Alliance already has enough signatures to put an antigay ballot initiative up for a vote
again in 1995 and 1996. Carol Ness, Study Finds Anti-Gay Activity Increasing, HouSTON
CHRON., Dec. 15, 1994, at 1. In Florida, antigay rights forces are attempting to pass antigay
ballot initiatives at the local level. Florida Group Will Not Pressfor Anti-Gay Amendment,
Reuters, July 21, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File. In fact, an anti-gayrights initiative passed in Gainesville, Florida in November of 1994. Sandi Dubowski, Florida is Burning, Ou-r, Mar. 1995, at 18. In Washington, at least one anti-gay-rights initiative
may be on the November ballot in 1996. Jim Simon, Anti-Gay Move Delayed, SEA-rLE
TIMES, Jan. 7, 1995, at Al. In Maine, an initiative is slated for the 1995 ballot that lists a
discrete set of the categories deserving of equal protection under state law without including sexual orientation. New Organization Seeks Equal Rights for Gays, BANGOR DAILY
NEWS, Aug. 26, 1994. In Ohio, a group called Equal Rights Not Special Rights Committee
(ERNSRC), formerly known as Take Back Cincinnati, has already passed an anti-gayrights initiative in Cincinnati and is planning a statewide initiative in Ohio. Cincinnati Voters Repeal Ban on Employment Bias Against Gays, 31 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 1475
(Nov. 8, 1993); see also John Gallagher, Taking the Initiative,THE ADvoc., Oct. 5, 1993, at
24 (discussing initiative movements in Ohio, Florida, Colorado, and Oregon). Initiatives
are also in the early stages of planning in Montana and California. Gallagher, supra,at 47.
For a helpful guide to future initiatives, see id. at 48-49 (depicting a map of the United
States and highlighting states where future initiatives are planned or likely to be planned).
5. The Establishment Clause has been incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment
to apply to the states. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108 (1943).
6. The full text of Amendment Two reads:
No protectedstatus based on homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation. Neither
the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor any of its
agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall enact,
adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or class of persons to
have or claim any minority status quota preferences, protected status or claim of
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egon.7 Such initiatives attempt, at the least, to roll back legislation
that makes discrimination based on sexual orientation illegal.8 Most
of these proposed initiatives, however, go further by precluding state
legislatures or city councils from outlawing discrimination against gay
men and lesbians. 9 In their worst form, these initiatives have sought
to equate homosexuality with pedophilia, sadism, and masochism and
have sought to prevent state governments from spending any money
to support gay and lesbian equality1o
In the past several years, supporters of lesbian and gay civil rights
have experienced both victories and defeats. On the one hand, issues
concerning sexual orientation discrimination have been vaulted into
the national spotlight by the publicity surrounding the gays in the milidiscrimination. This Section of the Constitution shall be in all respects selfexecuting.
COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b (enacted Nov. 3, 1992 by the electorate), enforcement permanently enjoined by Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1350 (Colo. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S.
Ct. 1092 (1995).
7. The text of Measure Nine reads:
(1) This state shall not recognize any categorical provision such as "sexual
orientation," "sexual preference," and similar phrases that includes [sic] homosexuality, pedophilia, sadism or masochism. Quotas, minority status, affirmative
action, or any similar concepts, shall not apply to these forms of conduct, nor shall
government promote these behaviors.
(2) State, regional and local governments and their properties and monies
shall not be used to promote, encourage, or facilitate homosexuality, pedophilia,
sadism or masochism.
(3) State, regional and local governments and their departments, agencies
and other entities, including specifically the State Department of Higher Education and the public schools, shall assist in setting a standard for Oregon's youth
that recognizes homosexuality, pedophilia, sadism and masochism as abnormal,
wrong, unnatural and perverse and that these behaviors are to be discouraged
and avoided.
(4) It shall be considered that it is the intent of the people in enacting this
section that if any part thereof is held unconstitutional, the remaining parts shall
be held in force.
Baker v. Keisling, 882 P.2d 1162, 1163-64 (Or. 1991).
8. For example, an organization known as the Riverside Citizens for Responsible
Behavior attempted to put an initiative on the Riverside, California ballot in November
1991 that would have reversed the Riverside City Council's AIDS discrimination policy as
well as Riverside's policy of including sexual orientation as an issue to be addressed by the
community relations commission. See Citizens for Responsible Behavior v. Superior
Court, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 648, 650-51 (Ct. App. 1991) (highlighting the pertinent language of
the Riverside ballot initiative).
9. The Riverside initiative also contained provisions that would disallow future attempts by the Riverside City Council to prohibit sexual orientation discrimination. Id
Similarly, the initiative in Oregon would have reversed nondiscrimination policies in Portland, and the Colorado initiative, if upheld, would have reversed the nondiscrimination
policies of Aspen and Denver. Brad Knickerbocker, Anti-Gay-Rights Initiatives Stir Hot
Debate in 3 States, CmusmA Sc. MoNrrOR, Oct. 13, 1992, at 6.
10. See supra note 7 for the text of the Oregon Ballot initiative.

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 46

tary issue," the historic March on Washington, 12 and the controversy

over the initiatives themselves.' 3 Gay rights supporters have won impressive victories in Oregon-the electoral defeat of Measure
Nine14-and in Colorado, where that state's Supreme Court struck
down Amendment Two' 5 as an unconstitutional denial of homosexuals' right to petition the legislature for redress.' 6 However, the gay
rights movement has also experienced major setbacks. For example,
after a massive effort by the military' 7 and the radical right,' 8 which
was spearheaded in Congress by Senator Sam Nunn, 19 President Clinton backed away from his pledge to end the military's discrimination
against lesbians and gay men. 20 In addition, the defeat of Measure
Nine in Oregon was followed by victories for anti-gay-rights groups at
the local level.21 Similarly, inspired by the electoral success of antigay
forces in Colorado, fundamentalist Christian and "family" organizations have proposed anti-gay-rights initiatives in states and localities
11. Anne Willette, White House Planning "All-Out Assault" To Sell Deficit Plan, Gannett News Service, July 19, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File; see also
Gary Tuchman, Gay Sailor Enjoys Celebrity of Coming Out in the Open, CNN, Jan. 29,
1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Script File (reporting the publicity surrounding
Naval Petty Officer Keith Meinhold's lawsuit against the military for being dismissed because he came out as a gay man).
12. See Jon Sawyer, Gay March Fills Streets of Capital; ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH,
Apr. 26, 1993, at 1A.
13. Lisa Keen, Referendums and Rights: Across the Country, Battles Over Protection
for Gays and Lesbians, WASH. POST, Oct. 31. 1993, at C3.
14. Boxall, supra note 4.
15. David 'filler, Colorado Can't Ban Gay Rights Measures, Advocates For Homosexuals Cheer Judges Ruling, Call Off Yearly Boycott of State, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 15, 1993, at
Al; see also Tamar Lewin, Sights Are Set on Other Anti-Gay Measures, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
15, 1993, at A22 (discussing gay rights supporters' efforts to capitalize on their legal success
in Colorado).
16. Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1339 (Colo. 1994), cert granted, 115 S. Ct. 1092
(1995). Gay rights litigators had also successfully enjoined the operation of Cincinnati's
anti-gay-rights initiative until the district court's decision was reversed on appeal. See
Equality Found. v. City of Cincinnati, 838 F. Supp. 1235, 1243 (S.D. Ohio 1993), rev'd, 54
F.3d 261, 271 (6th Cir. 1995), petition for cert.filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3122 (U.S. Aug. 10, 1995)
(No. 95-239).
17. Adam Nagourney, Tortuous Road to Gay Compromise, USA TODAY, July 23,
1993, at 8A.
18. David E. Anderson, Turmoil in the Pulpit; From Waco to Human Sexuality, Religion Had an Anxious Year, PHOENIX GAZETTE, Jan. 1, 1994, at B8.
19. Holly Morris, Gay Rights March Expected to Draw Thousands From Georgia, ATLANTA CONsr., Apr. 12, 1993, at B2.
20. Sellout?, THE ADvoc., Sept. 7, 1993, at 28.
21. Six municipalities passed initiatives that prohibit the passage of gay rights ordinances. John Gallagher, Shutout in Oregon, THE ADVOC., Aug. 10, 1993, at 30, see also
John Gallagher, The Awful Truce, Ti ADVOC., Sept. 7, 1993, at 30 (outlining Oregon
Governor Barbara Roberts' efforts to prevent localities from adopting anti-gay-rights
initiatives).
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nationwide and are likely to propose more initiatives over the next
several years. 22 In fact, the battle over anti-gay-rights initiatives will
face a crucial turning point in the next Supreme Court term when the
Justices decide whether Colorado's Amendment Two violates the
United States Constitution. 23
Legal commentators have addressed the constitutionality of antigay-rights initiatives and have suggested arguments for combatting
them.- 4 No one, however, has fleshed out the argument that anti-gay22. See supra note 4. Anti-gay-rights initiatives are primarily sponsored by organizations closely tied to the Religious Right. See infra notes 112-41 and accompanying text.
23. The Colorado case will provide many gay rights advocates the test case they have
been looking for. See Joan Biskupic, Gay Rights Activists Seek a Supreme Court Test Case,
WASH. PosT, Dec. 19, 1993, at Al, A28. In the past, many gay rights advocates had hoped
for a ruling by the Supreme Court that sexual orientation is grounds for suspect classification under the Equal Protection Clause. Today, lawyers are focusing on the narrower
political participation theory advanced by the Colorado Supreme Court. Shannon P.
Duffy, Gay Rights Under Fire in U.S. Supreme Court: Lambda Legal Lawyer Addresses
Gay Task Force, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 28, 1995, at 1. For commentators arguing
that the Supreme Court should find that lesbians and gay men are covered by the Equal
Protection Clause on the basis that sexual orientation can create a suspect classification,
see Harris M. Miller II, Note, An Argument For the Application of Equal Protection
Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications Based on Homosexuality, 57 S.CAL. L. REv. 797,
797-98; Note, The ConstitutionalStatus of Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality as a Suspect
Classification, 98 HARv. L. REv. 1285, 1287 (1985).
24. See Hans A. Linde, When Initiative Lawmaking is Not "Republican Government".
The Campaign Against Homosexuality, 72 OR. L. REv. 19, 19-20 (1993) (arguing that
rights-restricting ballot initiatives violate the Guarantee Clause of the federal Constitution
because they deny the citizens of a state their right to a republican form of government);
Debra F. Salz, Note, Discrimination-ProneInitiatives and the Guarantee Clause:A Role for
the Supreme Cour4 62 GEo. WAsH. L. Rnv. 100, 102 (1993) (same); Note, Constitutional
Limits on Anti-Gay-Rights Initiatives, 106 HARV. L. Rv. 1905, 1910-22 (1993) (outlining
possible challenges to anti-gay-rights initiatives under the Equal Protection Clause and
under the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of expression); Matthew Coles, Equal
Protection and the Anti-Civil-Rights Initiatives: Protectingthe Ability of Lesbians and Gay
Men to Bargainin the PluralistBazaar,55 Oio ST. L.J. 563, 574-75 (1994) (arguing that
anti-gay-rights initiatives violate the Equal Protection Clause because they preclude gays
and lesbians from participating in the political process); Craig Cassin Burke, Note, Fencing
Out Politically UnpopularGroupsfrom the Normal PoliticalProcesses: The Equal Protection Concerns of Colorado Amendment Two, 69 IND. L. J. 275, 276 (1993) (same); John F.
Niblock, Comment, Anti-Gay Initiatives:A Callfor HeightenedJudicialScrutiny, 41 UCLA
L. REv. 153, 180 (1993) (same); Lori J. Rankin, Comment, Ballot Initiatives and Gay
Rights: Equal Protection Challenges to the Right's Campaign Against Lesbians and Gay
Men, 62 U. CN. L. REv. 1055, 1103 (1994) (same); Robert J. Wagner, Note, Colorado
Amendment 2 and the Search for a FundamentalRight for Groups to ParticipateEqually in
the PoliticalProcess,38 ST. Louis U. L.. 523, 525 (1993-1994) (same); Stephen Zamansky,
Note, Colorado'sAmendment 2 and Homosexuals' Right to Equal Protection of the Law,
35 B.C. L. REv. 221, 254-56 (1993) (same); Mark E. Wojcik, Using InternationalHuman
Rights Law to Advance Queer Rights: A Case.Study for the American Declarationof the
Rights and Duties of Man, 55 Omo ST. L.. 649, 656-61 (1994) (applying international law
to antigay initiatives); Jane S. Schacter, The Gay Civil Rights Debatein the States: Decoding
the Discourseof Equivalents,29 HARv.C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 283, 295 (1994) (arguing that the
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violate the First Amendment's Establishment

Clause. 25 At first glance such an argument may seem fanciful-infocus on whether gays are like other protected classes is misguided). But see Richard F.
Duncan & Gary L. Young, Homosexual Rights and Citizen Initiatives: Is Constitutionalism
Unconstitutionall 9 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHics & PUB. POL'Y 93, 130-35 (1995) (arguing
that Colorado's Amendment Two is a legitimate expression of the views of the people of
the state of Colorado).
25. In a recent Ohio State Law Journal symposium on anti-gay-rights initiatives, one
participant presented a comprehensive and persuasive philosophical and historical argument for why the religion clauses of the First Amendment should render anti-gay-rights
initiatives unconstitutional. However, his Article does not provide a framework for how
that might be accomplished or argued using the Supreme Court's current construction of
Establishment Clause doctrine. See David A. J. Richards, Sexual Preferenceas a Suspect
(Religious) Classification: An Alternative Perspective on the Unconstitutionality of AntiLesbian/Gay Initiatives, 55 OHIo ST. L.J. 491,493 (1994). The authors of two Notes briefly
discuss the possibility of attacking anti-gay-rights initiatives on an Establishment Clause
basis, but reserve the question for future analysis. See Note, ConstitutionalLimits on AntiGay-Rights Initiatives, supra note 24, at 1921-22 (including some excellent researched material relevant to the Establishment Clause which helped me begin my Note-writing process); Niblock, supra note 24, at 156. In addition, an insightful commentator writing in a
nonlegal publication argues that anti-gay-rights initiatives should be struck down on an
Establishment Clause basis. Thomas W. Clark, Secularism and Sexuality: The Casefor Gay
Equality, THE HUMANIST, May/June 1994, at 23.
Other commentators have argued that various laws affecting lesbians and gay men
should be challenged on an Establishment Clause basis. See Timothy W. Reinig, Comment, Sin, Stigma & Society: A Critique of Morality and Values in Democratic Law and
Policy, 38 BUFF. L. REv. 859, 894-901 (1990) (arguing that sodomy laws violate the Establishment Clause); Paula A. Brantner, Note, Removing Bricks from a Wall of Discrimination: State Constitutional Challenges to Sodomy Laws, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 495, 521
(1992) (suggesting that an Establishment Clause argument would be useful to bolster a
privacy or equal protection challenge to state sodomy laws); see also Sherryl E. Michaelson, Note, Religion and Morality Legislation: A Reexamination of Establishment Clause
Analysis, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 301, 388-97 (1984) (setting out a new framework for Establishment Clause jurisprudence and discussing how to apply that framework to laws that prohibit same sex marriage).
In addition, on a somewhat analogous legal issue, commentators have suggested that
abortion regulations violate the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. See, e.g., Robert L. Maddox & Blaine Bortnick, Webster v. Reproductive Health Services: Do Legislative Declarations That Life Begins at Conception Violate the Establishment Clause?, 12
CAMPBELL L. REV. 1 (1989) (arguing that Justice Stevens's dissent in Webster, which would
have struck down Missouri's provision that life begins at conception, was correct, and that
the statute did indeed violate the Establishment Clause); Karen F. B. Gray, Case Comment, An Establishment Clause Analysis of Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 24
GA. L. REv. 399, 402 (1990) (same); David R. Dow, The Establishment Clause Argument
for Choice, 20 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 479, 479 (1990) (supporting the proposition that
abortion regulations in general violate the Establishment Clause); John Morton Cummings, Jr., Comment, The State, the Stork, and the Wall: The Establishment Clause and
Statutory Abortion Regulation, 39 CATH. U. L. REv. 1191, 1993 (1990) (same).
One commentator has suggested that gay rights advocates should not oppose antigay
activity because of its possible religious motivation because religion and religious people
cannot and should not be frozen out of public debate. Samuel A. Marcosson, The "Special
Rights" Canard in the Debate Over Lesbian and Gay Civil Rights, 9 NOTRE DAME J.L.
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deed, no court has ruled in favor of a gay rights position on an Establishment Clause basis. 26 Yet, religion is one of the core themes in any
discussion of the merits of gay rights. 27 The Supreme Court itself buttressed its now infamous 2 decision in Bowers v. Hardwick 9 with an
appeal to religious tradition:
ETmcs & PUB. POL'Y 137, 165-68 (1995). Such a position fails to draw a distinction between the legitimate participation of religious groups in public affairs and what happens
when laws that lack a legitimate secular purpose are actually adopted because of their
grounding in religious belief. It is the latter situation to which the Establishment Clause is
directed, and which gay rights advocates are justified in condemning. See infra Parts I-II.
26. On the other hand, courts have rejected the argument that laws restricting gay
rights violate the Establishment Clause. See, e.g., Hatheway v. Secretary of the Army, 641
F.2d 1376, 1384 (9th Cir. 1981) (rejecting the argument that the military's sodomy law
violates the Establishment Clause on the basis that the military has the secular justification
of preventing "disruptive conduct"); National Gay Task Force v. Board of Educ., No. CIV80-1174-E, 1982 WL 31038, at *12 (W.D. Okla. June 29, 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 729
F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1984), affd, 470 U.S. 903 (1985) (finding that a statute prohibiting a
public school teacher from advocating or encouraging homosexual conduct does not violate the Establishment Clause because it is "as much a reflection of... traditional values ... as it is the religious beliefs of any organization"); People v. Baldwin, 112 Cal. Rptr.
290, 292 (Ct. App. 1974) (relying on McGowan v. Maryland, see infra note 42, to dismiss
the argument that California's sodomy law violated the Establishment Clause); Stewart v.
United States, 364 A.2d 1205, 1208-09 (D.C. 1976) (same with District of Columbia's sodomy law). Finally, in the case of State v. Rhinehart, 424 P.2d 906, 909-10 (Wash. 1967),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 832 (1967), Justice Hunter of the Washington Supreme Court treated
an Establishment Clause challenge to Washington's sodomy law in a somewhat bizarre
fashion. Quoting from Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342-43 (1890), Justice Hunter, in
rejecting the defendant's Establishment Clause argument, noted that, "however free the
exercise of religion may be, it must be subordinate to the criminal laws of the country."
Rhinehart, 424 P.2d at 910. Then, Justice Hunter noted that polygamy and snake worship
could be proscribed even if antipolygamy and anti-snake-worship laws infringed upon religious beliefs. Id. Presumably, Judge Hunter felt that sodomy could be proscribed despite
that fact that it might be a religious belief, a claim that the plaintiff did not appear to be
making. Id
27. See JoiiN D'Emi~io, SEXUAL PoLrrIcs, SEXUAL CoMMuNrrms: Tim MACING OF
A HoMosExuAL MiNoRr' iN THE UNITED STATES 13 (1983) (discussing the historic role
that religion has played in shaping public attitudes towards lesbians and gay men).
28. The Court's decision in Bowers has been criticized by numerous commentators.
Se4 e.g., Janet E. Halley, ReasoningAbout Sodomy: Act and Identity In and After Bowers
v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REv. 1721, 1741-42 (1993); Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy,
102 HARV. L. Rv. 737, 747-50 (1989); Andrew Koppelman, Note, The Miscegenation
Analogy: Sodomy Law as Sex Discrimination,98 YALE L.J. 145, 148-49 (1988); Mitchell
Lloyd Pearl, Note, ChippingAway at Bowers v. Hardwick: Making the Best of an Unfortunate Decision, 63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 154, 189-90 (1988); Tracey Rich, Note, Sexual Orientation
Discriminationin the Wake of Bowers v. Hardwick, 22 GA. L. REv. 773,785 (1988); Joseph
Robert Thornton, Note, Bowers v. Hardwick: An Incomplete ConstitutionalAnalysis, 65
N.C. L. REv. 1100, 1122-23 (1987); Brett J. Williamson, Note, The ConstitutionalPrivacy
DoctrineAfter Bowers v. Hardwick: Rethinking the Second Death of Substantive Due Process, 62 S. CAL. L. Rv. 1297, 1327 (1989).
29. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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[P]roscriptions against sodomy have very "ancient roots." ... Condemnation of [homosexual conduct] is firmly rooted in JudeaoChristian moral and ethical standards. . . . Blackstone described
"the infamous crime againstnature" as an offense of "deeper malignity" than rape, a heinous act "the very mention of which is a disgrace to human nature," and "a crime not fit to be named."... To
hold that.., homosexual sodomy is somehow protected.., would
be to cast aside millennia of moral teaching. 30
This Note will demonstrate that religious forces are often the catalysts behind anti-gay-rights initiatives and that such forces are, at the
very least, intimately intertwined with the organizations that are seeking to roll back gay rights victories. An analysis of what the United
States Constitution says about religion is therefore crucial to a complete understanding of the relationship between anti-gay-rights initiatives and the Constitution.
This Note analyzes the relationship between First Amendment
Establishment Clause doctrine and common anti-gay-rights initiative
strategies. Part I of this Note will discuss the evolution of Establishment Clause doctrine and how that doctrine is relevant to anti-gayrights initiatives. Part II looks at what motivated the organizations
that sponsored anti-gay-rights initiatives in Oregon and Colorado, as
well as what motivates the network of organizations that are seeking
to legislate discrimination against lesbians and gay men around the
country.3 1 This Note will argue that the initiatives in Colorado, Oregon, and elsewhere are impermissibly motivated by religious purposes
and therefore should not pass muster under the Establishment Clause.
In Part III, this Note argues that even if courts are unpersuaded by a
pure purpose inquiry, they should still strike down anti-gay-rights initiatives because an objective observer would conclude that the initiatives are an attempt to endorse the belief systems of certain
fundamentalist Christian groups. Finally, this Note concludes that
striking down anti-gay-rights initiatives as violating the Establishment
30. Id. at 196-97 (Burger, C.J., concurring). Justice Blackmun recognized the Establishment Clause implications of laws targeted at gay men and lesbians in his dissent in
Bowers itself:
If [privacy] means anything, it means that, before Georgia can prosecute its citizens for making choices about the most intimate aspects of their lives, it must do
more than assert that the choice they have made is an ".abominable crime not fit
to be named among Christians."'
The assertion that "traditional Judeo-Christian values proscribe" the
conduct.., cannot provide an adequate justification for [Georgia's sodomy law].
The legitimacy of secular legislation depends instead on whether the State can
advance some justification for its law beyond its conformity to religious doctrine.
Id. at 199-200, 211 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Herring v. State, 46 S.E. 876, 882
(Ga. 1904)).
31. See supra note 4.
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Clause would strike at one of the core pillars of sexual orientation
discrimination and thus offer a way beyond legal and societal discrimination against lesbians and gay men.
I. The Supreme Court's Establishment Clause Doctrine
A. Fundamental Establishment Clause Values
Often, discussions of Supreme Court Establishment Clause doctrine begin with a recitation of the three prong test from Lemon v.
Kurtzman.32 This Note, however, looks further back into Supreme
Court religion doctrine in order to understand the values that the Establishment Clause protects. The modem approach to Establishment
Clause doctrine is often traced to Everson v. Board of Education.33 In
Everson, the Court was asked to determine whether a New Jersey
statute authorizing local school boards to provide public transportation to both public and parochial schools violated the Establishment
Clause. 4 The school board had authorized public funding for the
transportation of students to and from Catholic schools. 3 5 Consider-

ing the historical context of the religion clauses, 36 the Court determined that, at a minimum, the Establishment Clause requires that
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or
prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a
person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or
force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person
can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs ....
No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any
religious activities or institutions ....Neither a state nor the Fed32. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). For an example, see Leah Gallant Morgenstein, Note, Board
of Education of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens: Three "R's" + Religion =
Mergens, 41 AM. U. L. REv. 221, 224 (1991).
33. 330 U.S. 1 (1947); see Norman Redlich, The Separation of Church and State: The
Burger Court's Tortuous Journey, in Tun BURGER YEARS 56 (Herman Schwartz ed., 1987)
(discussing the historical importance of Everson to the development of Establishment
Clause doctrine).
34. Everson, 330 U.S. at 7-8.

35. Id.
at 3.
36. Justice Black discusses at length the historical context from which the Establishment Clause arose. To summarize briefly, many early American colonists came to the
"New World" to escape religious persecution. Many colonies, however, continued to practice the same religious intolerance that was common inEurope. Even after the colonies
drafted the Articles of Confederation, religious intolerance continued. Opposition to
state-supported religious activity was also common, and reached a climax in Virginia in

1785 and 1786, when Thomas Jefferson and James Madison persuaded the Virginia legislature to adopt the Virginia Bill of Religious Liberty. The First Amendment's Establishment
Clause was modeled after Virginia's statute, which was broadly conceived to allow reli-

gious liberty without forcing one person to support another's religion. See id.
at 8-15 &
nn.4-23.
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eral Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of
any religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words of
Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was
intended
to erect "a wall of separation between church and
37
State."

Despite this sweeping language, the Court concluded in Everson that
New Jersey's statute did not violate the Establishment Clause. 38 The
Court reasoned that the public funding of transportation to religious
schools was not different from public funding of police and fire protection for houses of worship and religious schools. 39 In the Court's
view, the transportation policy was merely an example of a general
welfare program that showed neither favoritism nor disfavoritism to
religion. 40 Issues similar to those in Everson-thatis, expenditures of
public money to benefit religious schools or other religious associations-are the thorny area from which the Lemon test evolved and to

of the Court's Establishment Clause doctrine is
which much
41
devoted.

37. Id. at 15-16 (emphasis added) (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164
(1878)).
38. Everson, 330 U.S. at 17.
39. Id. Justice Jackson's dissent, however, notes that the school board's policy
benefitted only Catholic students, not those students who attended Protestant schools or
private schools without religious affiliations. Thus, for Justice Jackson, the application of
the New Jersey Law showed favoritism to the Catholic religion in violation of the Court's
stated rule. Id. at 25-27 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 18.
41. For pre-Lemon Supreme Court cases dealing with these issues, see Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 680 (1970) (upholding New York law granting tax-exempt status to
religious organization); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236,248-49 (1968) (finding that a
statute that lent textbooks to students at nonpublic schools was not unconstitutional); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 315 (1952) (upholding law that allowed students to be dismissed from public school to attend religious instruction in nonschool buildings while other
students remained in school); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 209-12 (1948)
(invalidating a similar statute when the students received religious instruction in school
buildings). For post-Lemon cases dealing with similar subject matter, see, for example,
Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 488-89 (1986) (holding
that state assistance to a visually impaired person for rehabilitation service could be used
to pay tuition at a Christian College); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 413-14 (1985) (striking down a statute paying public school teachers to work at parochial schools); Grand
Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 397 (1985) (striking down a statute in which the city
paid public school teachers to work in parochial schools, and vice versa); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 255 (1977) (refusing to allow the lending of instructional equipment and
paying of field trips for private school students); Roemer v. Maryland Pub. Works Bd., 426
U.S. 736, 766-67 (1976) (upholding a state statute giving financial support to all qualifying
private colleges when the financial support could not be used for sectarian purposes); Hunt
v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734,749 (1973) (upholding state issuance of bonds to assist financing of
buildings used for secular purposes at church-related colleges); Committee for Pub. Educ.
v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 794 (1973) (striking down a statute granting tax credits and deductions to parents whose children attend private schools); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672,
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In McGowan v. Maryland,42 the Court considered the Establishment Clause in a different context. The issue in McGowan was
whether the continued existence of Maryland's Sunday Closing laws
violated the Establishment Clause. 43 In McGowan, several store employees were arrested for selling products on Sundays, in violation of
Maryland law.44 These employees argued that Maryland, in retaining
the Sunday Closing laws, had purposely promoted the predominant
Christian sects, which have their day of rest, their Sabbath, on Sunday.45 Assessing the constitutionality of the Sunday Closing statutes,
the Court conceded that the -laws were originally "motivated by religious forces."'46 However, the Court stated that its function was to
determine whether the Sunday legislation "still retain[ed] its religious
character." 47 The Court then extensively analyzed the secular arguments advanced over the last two centuries on behalf of Sunday Closing laws 48 and concluded that Maryland's reason for retaining the
Sunday Closing laws was to "provide a uniform day of rest for all citizens." 49 In upholding the Maryland Sunday Closing laws, the Court
stated that
[T]he "Establishment" Clause does not ban federal or state regulation of conduct whose reason or effect merely happens to coincide
or harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions .... [T]he

general welfare of society, wholly apart from any religious considerations, demands such regulation. Thus, for temporal purposes, murder is illegal. And the fact that this agrees with the dictates of the
50
Judeao-Christian religions... does not invalidate the regulation.
The principle laid down in the above quotation is black-letter law51
and is routinely quoted in court opinions that analyze whether a law
should be struck down on the basis of an impermissible religious motivation.52 In cases considering Establishment Clause claims involving
689 (1971) (upholding federal statute giving construction grants for buildings used for nonsectarian purposed at church-related colleges).
42. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
43. Id. at 422.
44. 1l at 422-23.
45. Id. at 431.
46. Id.
47. Id

48. Id. at 431-45 & nn.9-18.
49. Id. at 445.
50. Id. at 442.
GEOFFREY R. STONE ET. AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1488 (1991).
52. This is true of most of the cases that have rejected Establishment Clause challenges to laws affecting gay and lesbian rights. See Hatheway v. Secretary of the Army, 641
F.2d 1376, 1383-84 (9th Cir. 1981); National Gay Task Force v. Board of Educ., No. CIV80-1174-E, 1982 WL 31038, at *11 (W. D. Okla. June 29, 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 729
F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1984), affd, 470 U.S. 903 (1985); People v. Baldwin, 112 Cal. Rptr. 290,
292 (Ct. App. 1974); Stewart v. United States, 364 A.2d 1205, 1208-09 (D.C. 1976). McGowan is also routinely cited in cases analyzing whether a statute is impermissibly moti51.
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gay and lesbian rights, courts usually dismiss the claim summarily after
a quick recitation of the quotation from McGowan.53 Thus, anyone
arguing that a government practice that discriminates against gay men
and lesbians violates the Establishment Clause must distinguish
54
McGowan.
B.

The Lemon Test and Justice O'Connor's Endorsement Standard

Today, the quintessential test in Establishment Clause jurisprudence is derived from Lemon v. Kurtzman.55 In Lemon, the Court
decided whether state statutes that provided financial support to
teachers and for the teaching of secular subjects at parochial schools
were laws respecting an establishment of religion in violation of the
First Amendment.5 6 Deciding that these laws were an establishment
of religion,5 7 the Court announced a three-part test for whether a governmental activity violates the Establishment Clause. 58 The Court
stated:
Every analysis in this [Establishment Clause] area must begin
with consideration of the cumulative criteria developed by the
Court over many years. Three such tests may be gleaned from our
cases. First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must
not foster "an
'59
excessive government entanglement with religion."
The Lemon test remains the touchstone for Establishment Clause jurisprudence despite modifications to its formula over the years.60 Invated by religion. See Cammack v. Waihee, 932 F.2d 765, 778 (9th Cir. 1991); Tooley v.
Martin-Marietta Corp., 648 F.2d 1239, 1245 (9th Cir. 1981); Gilfillan v. City of Philadelphia, 637 F.2d 924, 929 (3rd Cir. 1980); Florey v. Sioux Falls Sch. Dist. 619 F.2d 1311, 1315
(8th Cir. 1980); Cardinal Sporting Goods Co. v. Eagleton, 213 F. Supp 207, 216 (E.D. Mo.
1963).
53. See supra note 52.
54. See infra notes 157-63 and accompanying text for this Note's argument that McGowan is distinguishable.
55. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
56. Id. at 606.
57. Id. at 625.
58. Id. at 612-13.
59. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)). In
the Lemon case itself, the Court concluded that the Pennsylvania and Rhode Island statutes in question fostered excessive governmental entanglement with religion and therefore
did not reach the question of whether the statutes would pass muster under the purpose
and effect prongs of the Lemon test. Id at 613-14.
60. STONE, supra note 51, at 1467-68. Only two Supreme Court cases since Lemon
have analyzed the Establishment Clause without reference to the Lemon test. See Marsh
v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792, 795 (1983) (upholding the constitutionality of opening
legislative sessions with prayers led by a state-employed chaplain on the basis of the unique
history of the practice and the fact the practice had become "part of the fabric of our
society"); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394 (1983) (noting that the Lemon test provides

July 1995]

GAY RIGHTS AND RELIGION

deed, recent cases in the Establishment Clause area have declined to
61
reconsider Lemon's fundamental Establishment Clause framework.
While the future of the Lemon test may be uncertain, the test will
probably remain the foundational framework for Establishment
Clause jurisprudence in the coming years. 62
The Court's modifications of the Lemon test stem primarily from
the efforts of Justice O'Connor.63 In Lynch v. Donnelly,64 the Court
was faced with the question of whether a municipality's inclusion of a
Nativity scene, or creche, 65 in its annual Christmas display violated the
Establishment Clause.66 Justice O'Connor, in her concurrence with
the majority's decision that the creche did not violate the Establishment Clause, sought to "clarif[y] [the Court's] Establishment Clause
doctrine." 67 O'Connor argued that the Establishment Clause stands
for two fundamental principles. First, the Establishment Clause is
designed to prevent "excessive [governmental] entanglement with
religious institutions. ' 68 By excessive entanglement, Justice O'Connor
meant situations in which government is forced to intrude upon the
activities of religious organizations by monitoring, keeping records, or
dictating their internal policies. 69 The second guiding principle of the
Establishment Clause, according to Justice O'Connor, is that governno more than a helpful signpost in Establishment Clause jurisprudence). Many commentators have criticized the Lemon test. Se4 eg., Leading Cases, 106 HARv. L. REv. 163, 25960 (1992) (noting the vast quantity of criticism directed at the Lemon test by both commentators and Supreme Court Justices); Mark E. Chopko, Religious Access to Public Programs
and GovernmentalFunding, 60 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 645, 654 (1992) (arguing for the abandonment of the "aptly named" Lemon test).
61. See Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481, 2494-95 (1994) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) (noting that the decision rested on principles set forth in the Lemon test);
Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141, 2149 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (referring to the Lemon test as akin to "some ghoul in a late-night horror movie
that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and
buried"); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993); Lee v. Weisman,
112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
62. The recent appointments of Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, both judicial moderates, should not alter the likelihood that the Lemon test will remain intact.
63. SToNE, supra note 51, at 1485.
64. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
65. The Court described the creche as "consist[ing] of the traditional figures, including the Infant Jesus, Mary and Joseph, angels, shepherds, kings, and animals." Id. at 671.
66. I. at 670-71. The Court decided that the creche did not violate the Establishment
Clause despite its religious nature, as it also had a secular purpose of bringing shoppers
into the city's business district. Id. at 685. In addition, the Court did not feel that the
creche had anything but a "remote and incidental" benefit to the Christian religion, nor did
it believe that any excessive entanglement had occurred. Id. at 683-84.
67. Id. at 687.
68. Id. at 687-88.
69. Id. at 688.
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ment must not endorse religion or religious beliefs. 70 As Justice
O'Connor explained the problem:
The second and more direct infringement is government endorsement or disapproval of religion. Endorsement sends a message to
nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that
they are insiders, favored members of 7the
1 political community. Disapproval sends the opposite message.
Lynch v. Donnelly involved this second principle of the Establishment
Clause. 72 In Lynch, O'Connor explained that the endorsement principle is embodied in the first two prongs of the Lemon test.7 3 She artwo prongs contain both an objective and a
gued that these first 74
subjective component:
The purpose prong of the Lemon test asks whether government's
actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion. The effect
prong asks whether, irrespective of government's actual purpose,
the practice under review in fact conveys a message of endorsement
or disapproval. An affirmative answer75 to either question should
render the challenged practice invalid.
In other words, a governmental practice violates the Establishment
Clause if the government actually "intends to convey a message of
endorsement or disapproval of religion" 7 6 or if an objective observer
would believe that the governmental practice endorses or disapproves
of either religion generally or a particular religion. 77 O'Connor further explained the application of the effects prong of the Lemon test
as follows:
[T]he effect prong of the Lemon test [does not] require invalidation
of a government practice merely because it in fact causes, even as a
primary effect, advancement or inhibition of religion.... What is
crucial is that a government practice not have the effect of communicating 7a8 message of government endorsement or disapproval of
religion.
Justice O'Connor's interpretation of the Establishment Clause
sets up a strong framework for preserving a strict separation between
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 690. Justice O'Connor viewed the first two prongs of the Lemon test as
aimed at preventing governmental endorsement of religion, whereas the entanglement
prong of Lemon was aimed at preventing governmental entanglement with religious institutions. O'Connor rejected the argument that fostering divisiveness over a religious issue
was sufficient for entanglement. Id. at 689.
73. Id. at 688.
74. Id. at 690.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 691.
77. Id. at 691-92.
78. Id.
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church and state. Under her standard, the Court has broad discretion

to determine whether a governmental practice has the impermissible
purpose or the impermissible effect of endorsing religion:
[W]hether a government activity communicates endorsement of
religion is not a question of simple historical fact. Although evidentiary submissions may help answer it, the question is, like the question whether racial or sex-based classifications communicate an
be answered on
invidious message, in large part a legal question to
79
the basis of judicial interpretation of social facts.

Yet, Justice O'Connor herself is not always willing to follow the logical
conclusions that a faithful application of her standard would seem to
dictate.80 In Lynch v. Donnelly, for example, Justice O'Connor found
that the purpose of the Nativity scene was not the endorsement of
religion but the "celebration of the public holiday [Christmas] through
its traditional symbols." 8' Justice O'Connor argued that endorsement
of Christianity was not conveyed by the Nativity scene because the
scene was a mere acknowledgment of the religious component of a
public holiday and not an endorsement of the Christian religion.8
In Wallace v. Jaffree,8 3 Justice O'Connor further explained the
purpose and effects prongs of the Lemon test.8 4 Agreeing that Alabama's statute requiring a moment of silence in public schools violated the Establishment Clause, Justice O'Connor argued that
Alabama's purpose in adopting the statute was to encourage prayer
during the moment of silence and thus to endorse religion.85 Justice
O'Connor explained the relevant inquiry as:
[W]hether the State has conveyed or attempted to convey the
message that children should use the moment of silence for prayer.
79. Id. at 693-94.
80. See Laurence H. Tribe, Colloquy: ConstitutionalCalculus: EqualJustice or Economic Efficiency?, 98 HARV. L. REv. 592, 610-11 (1985) (harshly criticizing the result in

Lynch and noting that "[o]ne cannot avoid hearing in Lynch a faint echo of the Court that
found nothing invidious in the Jim Crow policy of 'separate but equal"').
81. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 691.

82. Ld. at 692. Justice O'Connor makes little attempt to discuss why an objective observer would not view the creche as an endorsement of Christianity. Even assuming that
Christmas has become largely a commercial holiday, the creche explicitly celebrates the
Biblical story of the birth of Jesus. Thus, the creche acts to validate the Christian belief in
Jesus Christ. On the other hand, for nonbelievers, the government is sending the message
that the government approves the religious aspects of the holiday. In O'Connor's own
words, the creche tells nonbelievers that they are outsiders in a Christian town. See Tribe,
supra note 80, at 610 (highlighting the important question, posed by O'Connor and the
dissenters but not the majority in Lynch, of whether the endorsement sends a message to
nonbelievers that they do not belong in the political community).
83. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
84. Id. at 67-84. Justice O'Connor explained Lemon's purpose and effects prongs as
"requir[ing] courts to examine whether government's purpose is to endorse religion and
whether the statute actually conveys a message of endorsement." Id-at 69.
85. Id. at 67.
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This question cannot be answered in the abstract, but instead requires courts to examine the history, language, and administration
of a particular statute to determine whether it operates as an endorsement of religion.
The relevant issue is [also] whether an objective observer,
acquainted with the text, legislative history, and implementation of
86
the statute, would perceive it as a state endorsement of [religion].
After examining Alabama's moment of silence statute, Justice
O'Connor concluded that it was not designed merely to give students
a moment of silence to use as they wished, but to encourage religious
reflection. 87 Justice O'Connor reiterated her view that the Court must
play a strong role in evaluating the legislature's true purpose and in
88
discerning whether a professed secular purpose was merely a sham.
The majority of the Court has essentially adopted Justice
O'Connor's understanding of the Establishment Clause and her
reconceptualization of the Lemon test.89 As a result, O'Connor's
analysis is critical to determining the appropriate standard to apply
when analyzing whether a governmental practice is in violation of the
First Amendment's Establishment Clause. In County of Allegheny v.
9° Justice Blackmun indicated the Court's willingness to use
ACLU,
O'Connor's approach:
In recent years, we have paid particularly close attention to whether
the challenged governmental practice either has the purpose or effect of "endorsing" religion ....
* * * [T]he prohibition against governmental endorsement of
religion "preclude[s] government from conveying or attempting to
convey a message that religion or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred."91

In an opinion joined by Justice Stevens, Blackmun explicitly adopted
O'Connor's framework for analyzing the purpose and effects prongs
of the Lemon test. 92 Blackmun noted that five Justices in Lynch v.
Donnelly had accepted Justice O'Connor's "endorsement" standard
but had differed as to its application, and, thus, the majority decision
had been unable to adopt her approach explicitly. 93 Furthering the
86. Id. at 73-76 (footnote and citation omitted).
87. Id. at 77-79.
88. Id. at 74-76.
89. Justice O'Connor's approach was in large part adopted by the Court in County of
Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592 (1989).

90. Id.
91. Id. at 592-93 (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70 (1985) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)) (alteration in original).
92. Id. at 595.
93. Id. at 597. In Lynch v. Donnelly, O'Connor applied the endorsement standard to
uphold the municipality's display of a Nativity scene as part of a Christmas display, while
the four dissenters who supported O'Connor's standard reached the opposite conclusion.
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conclusion that the Court is likely to use Justice O'Connor's endorsement framework in the future is the fact that, in County of Allegheny
v. ACLU, four Justices concurred with Justice Blackmun on the validity of Justice O'Connor's formulation.94 The four partial concurrences, however, disagreed with Blackmun's application of the
O'Connor approach, again preventing a majority opinion from adopting Justice O'Connor's test.95 Nevertheless, a majority of the Court
96
supported Justice O'Connor's Establishment Clause framework.
Even earlier than County of Allegheny v. ACLU, the Court was
willing to strike down legislation as impermissibly motivated by a religious purpose.97 A notable example of the Court's willingness to inquire into legislative purpose in order to determine whether a statute
violates the Establishment Clause is Edwards v. Aguillard,98 in which
the Court struck down99 Louisiana's Creation Science statute.100 In
Edwards, the Louisiana Legislature expressly provided that the purpose of the Creation Science statute was to promote academic freedom in the public schools by allowing different points of view to be
presented. 101 The Court, however, struck down the statute because
the professed legislative purpose was disingenuous.1 °2 The Court
noted that, "[w]hile the Court is normally deferential to a State's articulation of a secular purpose, it is required that the statement of such
purpose be sincere and not a sham."' 03 Specifically, the Court ex94. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 602.
95. Id at 623-55. The disagreement again was over whether a Nativity scene constituted an endorsement of religion.
96. STONE, supra note 51, at 1485.
97. See e.g., Texas Monthly Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1989) (rejecting a Texas
statute that granted preferential tax treatment to religious publications as lacking a secular
purpose); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985) (concluding that Alabama lacked a
secular purpose in adopting its moment of silence legislation for public schools); Stone v.
Graham, 449 U.S. 39,41 (1980) (finding no "secular legislative purpose" for the posting of

the Ten Commandments on the wall of a public school classroom); Epperson v. Arkansas,
393 U.S. 97, 98 (1968) (striking down an Arkansas statute that forbade the teaching of
evolution when the statute was a "product of the upsurge of [a] 'fundamentalist' religious
fervor"); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223-24 (1963) (holding that the
reading of ten Bible verses per day in a public school had the impermissible purpose of
promoting religion and was not used to further secular educative purposes); Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 433 (1962) (finding even nondenominational prayer recitation in public school unconstitutional because the prayer had the purpose of promoting religion
generally).
98. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).

99.

Id.
at 582.

100. The statute forbade teachers in public schools from teaching evolution unless the
theories of "creation science" were also taught. Id. at 581.
101. Id. at 586.

102. I& at 587-94.
103. 1d at 586-87.
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amined the legislative history behind the Creation Science statute and
concluded that:
It is clear ...that the purpose of the legislative sponsor.., was to

narrow the science curriculum....
h..[T]he Act does not serve to protect academic freedom, but
has the distinctly different purpose of discrediting "evolution by
counterbalancing its teaching at every turn with the teaching of
creationism. ... "
...

The preeminent purpose of the Louisiana Legislature was

clearly to advance the religious viewpoint that a supernatural being
created humankind....
...
[B]ecause the primary purpose of the Creationism Act is to
endorse a particular religious doctrine,1 the
4 Act furthers religion in
violation of the Establishment Clause. "
Edwards and other similar cases provide a doctrinal basis for inquiring
into the actual purpose of a law, even in circumstances in which the
sponsors profess a legitimate secular purpose.
Thus, the Court has stuck down laws that are impermissibly motivated by religion. 10 5 Today's courts should strike down anti-gay-rights
initiatives for being impermissibly motivated by similar religious purposes. Even if the Court does not use Justice O'Connor's endorsement standard in the future, the Court's historic willingness to look
behind a professed secular purpose and to strike down laws that are
impermissibly motivated by religion shows that a purpose analysis will
be important under any future Establishment Clause framework. Furthermore, the objective element of O'Connor's endorsement standard
provides an additional reason why anti-gay-rights initiatives violate
the Establishment Clause. The remaining sections of this Note argue
that striking down anti-gay-rights initiatives on the basis of the subjective and objective prongs of Establishment Clause doctrine presents a
theoretically sound and prudentially beneficial outcome to the legal
battle over anti-gay-rights initiatives.

104. Id. at 587-94 (quoting the court of appeals).
105. The Supreme Court has also struck down legislation based on an impermissible
purpose despite a professed legitimate purpose in the area of equal protection. See, e.g.,
United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (striking down section 3(e) of
the Food Stamp Act, which excluded households with two or more unrelated individuals
from the Food Stamp program, as impermissibly directed at "hippies" and "hippie communes"); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347-48 (1960) (holding that if the plaintiffs
could prove that the City of Thskeegee excluded a grossly disproportionate number of
African-American citizens in a boundary redesign then an impermissible motive would be
established and the boundary redesign would be unconstitutional); Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886) (finding that a San Francisco laundry regulation was unconstitutional because its actual purpose was to discriminate against Chinese-Americans).
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H. Anti-Gay-Rights Initiatives Violate the Subjective
Component of Establishment Clause Doctrine
This section examines the motivations behind the anti-gay-rights
initiatives in Oregon, Colorado, and around the country and concludes that these initiatives are largely the product of religious forces
attempting to cement their vision of homosexuality onto the secular
polity. Thus, following the Supreme Court in Edwards, courts faced
with challenges to anti-gay-rights initiatives should conduct a vigorous
inquiry into the motivation behind the initiatives and refuse to accept
any professed secular purpose at face value.
When examining Establishment Clause challenges to governmental practices, courts will be guided by Justice O'Connor's Establishment Clause framework and will ask if the anti-gay-rights initiative in
question was adopted with the purpose of endorsing religion. 10 6 In
reaching their decisions, courts will also pay close attention to McGowan v. Maryland'0 7 and avoid striking down laws that merely "coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions.' 08 Thus,
it is insufficient simply to argue that because many religions condemn
homosexuality, anti-gay-rights initiatives violate the Establishment
Clause. 10 9 Most religions condemn murder and theft, but obviously,
statutes condemning such practices not only are consistent with the
Establishment Clause, but also are fundamental to maintaining order
in a society based on law. Thus, successfully arguing that an anti-gayrights initiative violates the Establishment Clause means demonstrating that the initiative was adopted with the purpose of endorsing a
106. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 595 (1989).
107. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
108. Id. at 442.
109. For a description of religious opposition to homosexuality, see generally MEL
WHrrE, STRANGER AT THE GATE: To BE GAY AND CHRISTIAN IN AMERICA (1994)
(describing an insider's view of the Religious Right's opposition to lesbian and gay rights);
George R. Edwards, A Critique of CreationistHomophobia, 18 J. OF HOMOSEXUALrrY 95
(1989-1990) (analyzing homophobic and misogynist interpretations of Genesis 1-3 and proposing an alternative liberationist reading); Robert Nugent & Jeannine Gramick, Homosexuality: Protestant, Catholic and Jewish Issues; A Fishbone Tale, 18 J. OF
HOMOSEXUALrrY 7 (1989-1990) (highlighting some of the common issues denominations
face in their examination of homosexuality); Rabbi Yoel H. Kahn, Judaismand Homosexuality: The Traditionalist/ProgressiveDebate, 18 J. OF HoMOsExuALrny 47 (1989-90) (arguing that Jewish teaching on homosexuality is grounded in an erroneous world view that
sees heterosexual marriage as the only route to religious and personal fulfillment). Religious opposition to homosexuality is often based on the professed belief that the Bible
condemns homosexuality and that Western religions have historically condemned the practice of homosexuality. See Stanton L. Jones, The Loving Opposition: Speaking the Truth in
a Climate of Hate CHIsT. TODAY, July 19, 1993, at 18 (arguing that the Bible does condemn homosexual behavior). For a noted scholarly response to the argument that religion
and the Bible have historically condemned homosexuality, see JOHN BOSWELL, CHRisTIANrry, SOCiAL TOLERANCE & HOMOSEXUALrrY (1980).
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religious belief, not that it simply happens to coincide with common
religious dogma.
A. Whose Intent Should Be Analyzed

Demonstrating that anti-gay-rights initiatives are advocated and
adopted with the intent of endorsing religion should not be a difficult
task. However, determining the intent behind anti-gay-rights initiatives-since they are initiatives" 0-requires a somewhat different approach than that used when courts determine the legislative intent
behind a law such as the Creation Science statute in Edwards v. Aguillard. Thus, a court faced with an anti-gay-rights initiative must determine the actors whose intent should be analyzed.
The intent of several actors is potentially relevant to determining
the true purpose behind a ballot initiative. A court could look at the
intent of the sponsors and advocates of the initiative, the intent of the
voting public, or both. Reality, however, dictates that the intent of the
sponsors and advocates of the initiative will be far more important
than that of the voting public. Determining the intent of the public in
a judicial setting would be an extremely difficult task, as discovering
why any particular individual cast a ballot for or against an anti-gayrights initiative is nearly impossible."' Furthermore, examining the
intent of the sponsors and advocates of a ballot initiative is the
method recommended by the standard legal treatise on statutory interpretation. 1 2 In addition, in standard legislative purpose analyses,
the courts do not examine the reasons why each member of the legis110. Typically, anti-gay-rights initiatives are public referendums that can become law
through the majority vote of the relevant jurisdiction-be it a state, county, city, or township. See, e.g., David Schaefer, Northwest May be a Testing Ground on Gay Rights-Two
Sides Preparefor Electoral Battles, SEATTLE TIMEs, Dec. 10, 1993, at Al (discussing antigay initiative measures in Washington, Oregon, and Idaho and the work of the organizers
on both sides of the issue).
111. Poll data from after an election might be available, but the utility of such data
would be highly suspect because the information would be limited to the questions asked
by the pollster, and many people would not respond to a poll by stating that they were
attempting to endorse their religious beliefs. For a good essay discussing the limitations of
statistical analysis, see Nancy Roth, Economics as Poetry, reprinted in RODERICK P. HART,
MODERN RHETORICAL CRITIcIsM 42 (1990).
112. According to Sutherland on Statutory Construction:
Explanations and informative materials on a proposed bill are often made available to the public before initiative petitions or referendum elections on the bill.
This material is considered relevant legislative history for purposes of construction of a measure after its enactment. The rules of statutory interpretation apply
to initiatives.
SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 48.19 (5th ed. 1992). Courts that have faced
the question of interpreting a ballot initiative have not approached the task differently
from typical efforts at statutory construction. See, e.g., Mulkey v. Reitman, 413 P.2d 825,
829 (Cal. 1966), affd, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (construing California's Proposition Fourteen,
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lature voted for or against a bill; rather, the courts look at the intent of
the sponsors of the legislation and at what was said by advocates of
the legislation. 113 Finally, the intent of the voting public is likely to be
at least partly reflected by the intent of the sponsors and advocates of
the initiative. Thus, when courts question the purpose of an anti-gayrights ballot initiative, the intent of its sponsors and advocates will be
most relevant.
B. The Purpose of Anti-Gay-Rights Initiatives is to Endorse Religion

An examination of Oregon's Measure Nine, Colorado's Amendment Two, and various other anti-gay-rights initiative movements indicates that their primary purpose
is to endorse the belief system of
114
fundamentalist Christianity.
(1)

Oregon

The ballot initiative in Oregon sought to amend the Oregon State
Constitution to declare, in part, that "[s]tate, regional and local governments ... shall assist in setting a standard for Oregon's youth that

recognizes homosexuality, pedophilia, sadism and masochism as abnormal, wrong, unnatural and perverse and that these behaviors are to
be discouraged and avoided."" 5 The Oregon initiative made its way
onto the November 1992 ballot largely through the efforts of the Orewhich permitted individuals to "sell, lease, or rent" their property in a racially discriminatory manner).
113. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578,587-92 (1987) (analyzing statements made
during legislative hearings by sponsor of challenged statute).
114. As one gay activist member of the organization Gays United to Attack Repression and Discrimination, which is fighting the anti-gay-rights initiatives in Florida, stated,
It's our goal to lift up the rock and expose that fundamentalist faction [the reclaim America conference in Florida] for what it truly is. What these people are
doing has nothing to do with family values, nothing to do with tolerance. What
these people are doing is to try to codify into law their version of the Bible. And
nothing could be more scary for democracy than that.
Angela Bradbury, Christian Group Aims to Reclaim Nation, S.F. SENTINEL, Jan. 12, 1994,
at 4. Urvashi Vaid, former executive director of the National Gay and Lesbian Task force,
in her speech at the March on Washington, characterized the issue as "a struggle between
democracy and theocracy."
For an extreme example of the Religious Right's attempt to have government endorse
its beliefs, there is the Reverend Fred Phelps of Topeka, Kansas, who picketed the March
on Washington and funeral services for gay men who have died of AIDS with placards
saying: "Praise God For A.I.D.S.," "Fags Bum in Hell," and "Gays Deserve to Die," and
was quoted as saying: "The fags are going to the seminaries and occupying the pulpits....
For me this is a religious war." Chris Bull, Us vs. Them, TFIm ADvoc., Nov. 2, 1993, at 41.
115. For the full text of Measure Nine, see supra note 7. For a detailed discussion of
the organizing of Measure Nine, see John Gallagher, The Rise of Fascism in America, THE
ADvoc., Nov. 3, 1992, at 37.
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gon Citizens Alliance (OCA) and its leader, Lon Mabon. 116 In Oresupport came from
gon, much of OCA's financial and grass-roots
' 17 Pat Robertson's 1 8
"fundamentalist and evangelical churches.'
Christian Coalition opened a field office for Lon Mabon's ballot initiative campaign and contributed money to the effort." 9 In fact, one
factor shared by all of the anti-gay-rights initiatives is that the majority
organizations or organizations
of their funding comes from religious
20
closely tied to the Religious Right.
In Oregon, not only did a large portion of the financing for Measure Nine come from organizations affiliated with the Religious Right,
but the ideology driving the initiative was religious. In an interview
with the Seattle Times, Lon Mabon stated that employers and landlords should have the right not to hire or rent apartments to gay men
because gays are "sinful.' 12 ' He stated that the increasing acceptance
of homosexuality was an indicator that "our culture was degenerating
morally.' 22 In discussing the Christian Coalition's support for the
OCA, the OCA's executive director was quoted as saying, "the entire
pro-family agenda is endangered if homosexuals are recognized as a
legal and cultural entity ....

[The OCA's opponents] strike at the

heart of what we as a society affirm and value.' 23 In Oregon, the
that homosexuality is
ballot initiative itself contained language stating
"abnormal, wrong, unnatural, and perverse,' 24 language of morality
that subtly reveals the religious motivation of the initiative's drafters.
(2)

Colorado

In Colorado, the anti-gay-rights initiative that passed in November, 1992125 was known as Amendment Two. Amendment Two did
116. Gallagher, supra note 115. For a biographical portrait of Lon Mabon and a discussion of the rise of the Oregon Citizens Alliance, see Marc Ramirez, Lon Mabon Sets
'Em Straight, SEAttLE TIMEs, Oct. 3, 1993, at 12.
117. Gallagher, supra note 115, at 40.
118. For a biographical portrait of Pat Robertson, see Rupert Cornwell, Profile: A
Corporate Messiah, THE INDEPENDENT, Oct. 4, 1992, at 13 (noting the close connection
between religion, politics, and money in Robertson's life). See also Pat Kossan, Switching
Sides, PHOENiX GAZET-rE, July 10, 1993, at D6 (quoting Mel White, a former Robertson
confidant and the ghostwriter for Robertson's autobiography, as saying that Robertson and
fellow religious leader Jerry Falwell "don't believe in democracy. They believe in a theocracy .... They really believe God should be in charge of this nation and they are the
closest link to God").
119. Gallagher, supra note 115, at 40.
120. Lisa Keen, Referendums and Rights: Across the Country, Battles Over Protection
for Gays and Lesbians, WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 1993, at C3.
121. Ramirez, supra note 116.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Supra note 7.
125. Boxall, supra note 4.
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not contain the striking rhetoric of the Oregon initiative, 126 but its
backers and advocates were largely groups associated with the Religious Right.1 27 The organization that spearheaded the effort was Colorado For Family Values (CFV). 128 CFV's most effective rhetorical
strategy was to cast the issue as one of "no special rights."'1 29 The "no
special rights" strategy had the advantage of making the initiative
look like a measure to prevent affirmative action based on sexual orientation, 130 rather than an amendment to foreclose lesbians and gay
men from obtaining equal rights. 131 Although CFV's campaign strategy focused on "no special rights," its true aim was to endorse the
religious view that homosexuality is sinful.' 32 For example, Kevin
126. Rather, the amendment simply forbids the state or municipalities froin granting
"protected status" to gays and lesbians. Colorado Struggles Against Extremism, Tm ADvoc., Nov. 3, 1993, at 42. For the full text of Colorado's Amendment Two, see supra note
6.
127. See Note, ConstitutionalLimits on Anti-Gay-Rights Initiatives, supra note 24, at
1921 n.125, in which the author states:
Colorado for Family Values turned to the National Legal Foundation, a conservative Christian legal organization founded by Pat Robertson and originally funded
by Robertson's Christian Broadcasting Network, to draft the language of Amendment Two. Several board members of Colorado for Family Values are born-again
Christians who view homosexuality as a "sin" and as an "abomination of almighty
God."
Id. (citing Jean Hardisty, ConstructingHomophobia, PUBLic EYE, Mar. 1993, at 7, 9). Furthermore, one of the major supporters of Amendment Two, former University of Colorado
football coach Bill McCartney, is the founder of "Promise Keepers," a fast-growing Christian evangelical movement; McCartney has condemned homosexuality as an "abomination
against Almighty God." Don Lattin, ChristianWarriors,S.F. CHRON., May 28, 1995, at 1.
128. John Gallagher, Colorado Goes Straightto Hell Tim ADvoc., Feb. 23, 1993, at 3536.
129. Id. at 36.
130. See Valerie Richardson, Amendment Two, Act I;Gay-Rights Foe Builds on Colorado Victory, WASH. TnAms, June 2, 1993, at Al (discussing CFV's strategy of toning down
religious rhetoric and focusing on fairness issues, even though CFV's support was largely
from religious organizations).
131. For a persuasive essay on this issue, see Deb Price, Job Discrimination Says:
"They Don't Belong Here" STAR TRm., Dec. 15, 1993, at 9E (comparing the rhetoric of
"no special rights" to nineteenth-century antipathy towards Chinese-Americans and the
circumstances that gave rise to the Yick Wo case, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)).
132. The "no special rights" campaign was undeniably a sham in Colorado, and in fact
CFV was attempting to preclude gays and lesbians from having any rights at all. In advising CFV as to the language it should use to phrase the Colorado initiative, one of their
attorneys, Brian M. McCormick, wrote in a letter:
I believe "No Special Privileges" is a good motto for the amendment's public
campaign, but I fear the possible legal ramifications if it is included in the amendment itself. The language of the amendment should prohibit homosexuals from
claiming any rights regarding employment, education, housing or status.
Evidence Offered that Anti-Gay Group Misled Colorado Voters, BAY WnSmows, Feb. 25,
1993, at 1.
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Tebedo, the Executive Director of Colorado for Family Values, described Amendment Two as
[A]bout whose authority takes precedence in the society in which
we live .... [I]s it the authority of God? The authority of the
Supreme King of Kings and Lord of Lords? You see, we say we
should have the separation of church and state, but you see, Jesus
the Lord of Lords. That is politics;
Christ is the King of King and
133
that is rule; that is authority.
In addition, a press release by Colorado for Family Values following
the judicial defeat of Amendment Two revealed the religious nature
of CFV's antipathy toward lesbian and gay rights by stating that upholding lesbian and gay rights is equivalent to "outlawing the expression of 2,000 years of Judeo-Christian ethics regarding sexual
1 34
behavior."
A viewpoint piece in the generally conservative Dallas Morning
News aptly summed up the deceitful manner in which CFV
campaigned:
Family values have come to Colorado.... In the logic of Colorado for Family Values... equal rights became "special rights." The
campaign Colorado for Family Values waged was brilliantly deceitful and manipulative. It appealed to religious prejudice, pitted minorities against each other, exploited latent fears of employment
quotas, and crafted contorted ballot wording that even confused ardent supporters of equal rights.... Colorado for Family Values (a
group with ties to national fundamentalist organizations) claims that
it is not motivated by hate, bigotry, homophobia or religious prejudice. Yet it canvassed the state with an eight-page tabloid replete
discredited studies .... repugwith misinformation, spurious facts,
135
nant innuendo, and outright lies.
(3) A Network of Organizations
The campaigns in Colorado and Oregon are merely examples of
initiatives backed by the Religious Right in order to have government
endorse their religious beliefs. A network of organizations are targeting lesbians and gay men 13 6 to garner public support for the Radical
133. Hardisty, supra note 127, at 9.
134. Press Release, Colorado for Family Values, Oct. 11, 1994 (on file with Kevin
Tebedo, P.O. Box 190, Colorado Springs, Colo. 80901). Invoking appeals to religious tradition is common for Colorado for Family Values. See Don Feder, The Gays' Advance: Implacable, Deadly, CFV REP., Sep. 1994, at 3 (in which the CFV's newsletter stated: "to
surrender on this [gay rights] issue would be a capitulation of the entire Judeo-Christian

ethic").
135. John Wilkens, A Deceitful Anti-Gay Campaign,DALLAS MORNING NEWS,Jan. 12,
1993, at 15A.
136. See NATIONAL GAY AND LESBIAN TASK FORCE, FIGrr THE RIGrr ACTION Krr
27-29 (1993) (outlining organizations that target lesbians and gay men); PoLIcAL RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, ORGANIZATIONS CURRENTLY TARGETING LESBIANS, GAY MEN,
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Right's religious agenda. 137 While backers of anti-gay-rights initiatives often claim that their initiatives develop from grass roots support, these initiative-backers actually rely on a "sophisticated network
of conservative fundamentalist Christian organizations for funding,
organization and support."' 38 As in Colorado, these organizations
often deliberately conceal their true religious nature to trick the public into voting for their initiatives. 139 The executive director of the
Christian Coalition himself said that the organization "learned how to
move under the140radar in the cover of the night" in order to achieve its
religious goals.
Many sponsors of anti-gay-ights initiatives are explicitly motivated by the goal of importing fundamentalist Christian ideals into
secular society. For example, Paul Weyrich, founder of the Free Congress Foundation, a national organization that seeks to eliminate civil
rights for gay people, said, "[w]ell, first of all, from our point of view,
this is the most significant battle... between the forces of God and
the forces against God.' 4 ' Similarly, the Concerned Women of
America, who describe themselves as the "Christian Woman's Answer" to the National Organization for Women, has sought to raise
hundreds of thousands of dollars to oppose the "repulsive" gay civil
rights movement that, in their words, seeks to "destroy our JudeoChristian Heritage."' 42 In addition, the Anaheim, California-based
Traditional Values Coalition, led by the Reverend Lou Sheldon, "oppose[s] local and statewide legislative attempts to grant.., protection
to homosexuals" by seeking to "alert and mobilize the evangelical
its forces for the preservation of traditional
community and marshall 43
Judeo-Christian values.'
C. No Legitimate Secular Purpose Exists for Anti-Gay-Rights Initiatives
The examples and quotations in the preceding subsections are not
an exhaustive analysis of the evidence a court should use in determining the goals of sponsors and advocates of anti-gay-rights initiatives.
AND BISEXUALS 1-6 (1993) (same); Briefing, SALT

LAKE

TRB., Aug. 27, 1994, at A2

(describing how evangelical ministers backed anti-gay-rights initiative in Idaho); David
Tller, Christians Leading CrusadeAgainst Gays in the Heartland,S.F. CHRON., Apr. 25,
1994, at Al (discussing Christian leadership in antigay activity in rural states).
137. MAB SEGrRsr & LEORNARD ZESKnD, QuARANmms AND DEATH: THE FAR
RIGHT'S HoMOPHOBIC AGENDA (1989).
138. Hardisty, supra note 127, at 4.
139. See Frederick Clarkson, Inside the Covert Coalition, CHURCH & ST., Nov. 1992, at
4, 7 (noting that "Christian Coalition leaders are boastful about their 'stealth' tactics").
140. Id.
141. Hardisty, supra note 127, at 8.
142. Letter from Beverly LaHaye, President, Concerned Women for America, to Concerned Friends 2-3 (Feb. 1991).
143. TRADmONAL VALUES COALITION, MISSION STATEMENT 1.
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Courts should also examine the internal memoranda of sponsors and
large financial contributors to anti-gay-rights initiatives, as well as
print and television advertisements supporting such initiatives. In addition, courts should examine the validity of the sponsors' and advocates' professed purpose.
An initiative like Oregon's Measure Nine would appear to be the
easiest to strike down as having an impermissible religious motivation.
Concluding that the Oregon initiative was designed to do anything
other than endorse fundamentalist Christianity runs contrary to the
facts. Although being against gay rights without being religious may
be theoretically possible-assuming one could view gays as immoral
or unnatural without a biblical referent-the OCA's efforts go fur1' 45
ther. 144 Lon Mabon explicitly refers to homosexuality as "sinful,'
and the ballot initiative contains the less overtly religious words "abnormal, wrong, unnatural, and perverse."' 146 Such rhetoric does not
invoke a secular concept of morality, but rather expresses the religious
nature of the OCA's opposition to gay rights. 147 However, while the
Oregon initiative may seem most susceptible to an Establishment
Clause challenge, the less strident rhetoric of the Colorado initiative
and other initiatives should not make them any less vulnerable. Because any professed secular purpose for an anti-gay rights initiative
would be analytically weak at best, all those anti-gay initiatives that
are generated from the radical Religious Right should fail a constitutional challenge based on the Establishment Clause.
(1) The "No Special Rights" Argument
While the Colorado-style initiative does not contain any facially
religious language, there is little question that many, if not all, of the
organizations that back anti-gay-rights initiatives do so to get their
religious beliefs endorsed by the government. The sponsors and advocates of anti-gay-rights initiatives, however, often assert that the purpose of the initiatives is merely to preclude lesbians and gay men from
attaining "special rights.' 48 While the "special rights" argument may
be an effective campaign slogan, it is clearly disingenuous as a secular
rationale for anti-gay-rights initiatives.
144. See supra notes 114-24 and accompanying text.
145. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
146. See supra note 7.
147. One commentator has suggested that describing gays as unnatural is inherently
nonsecular, as it cannot be divorced from the religious origins of natural law. Clark, supra
note 25, at 23.
148. See supra note 129 and accompanying text; see also Marcosson, supra note 25
(extensively critiquing the "no special rights" argument).
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First, in most places gays and lesbians do not yet have the panoply of civil fights protections that other minority groups possess. 149 In
other words, while firing an employee based on her race or her sex is
illegal, firing an employee based on her sexual orientation is not.
Thus, anti-gay-rights initiatives freeze a discriminatory status quo and
have nothing to do with "special" rights for anyone. In addition, the
claim that barring localities from outlawing sexual orientation discrimination combats "special rights" implies that all civil rights laws give
special rights-thus, Title VII gives special rights to African-Americans and to women. This implication is spurious because civil rights
laws are laws of general applicability; in other words, Title VII forbids
discrimination based on race and sex, not just discrimination against
black people and discrimination against women. 150 Similarly, laws
that prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation do not protect
only lesbians and gay men, but forbid discrimination against heterosexuals as well. Antidiscrimination laws do not give special protection to minority groups, but rather provide that people may not use
certain criteria, such as race, sex, or sexual orientation, in making decisions about whom to employ, or to whom an apartment should be
rented.
The sponsors and advocates of antigay ballot initiatives might respond that the purpose of the initiatives is to prevent states or localities from adopting affirmative action programs on behalf of lesbians
and gay men and that affirmative action really is a special right. While
the question of whether affirmative action for lesbians and gay men is
accurately characterized as a special right or merely as a remedy for
past discrimination is beyond the scope of this Note,15 ' any argument
that the secular purpose of ballot initiatives is to preclude affirmative
action is fallacious. First, laws in Colorado and elsewhere that prohibit sexual orientation discrimination do not authorize affirmative action. 52 In fact, in many instances, laws that forbid sexual orientation
discrimination specifically preclude the use of affirmative action on
149. See Constitutional Limits on Anti-Gay-Rights Initiatives, supra note 25, at app.
(charting the states and localities that do grant some civil rights protections to lesbians and
gay men). While lacking any protection for gays and lesbians, federal civil rights laws give
comprehensive protection on the bases of race, color, sex, age, disability, and religion. See,
e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994) (protection against employment discrimination). Lesbians
and gay men thus stand as the last major societal group that does not have legally guaranteed civil rights in this country.
150. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
151. See Jeffrey S. Byrne, Affirmative Action for Lesbians and Gay Men: A Proposal
for True Equality of Opportunity and Workplace Diversity, 11 YALE L. & PoL'Y REv. 47,

52-89 (1993) (arguing in favor of affirmative action based on sexual orientation).
152. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102.1 (West Supp. 1995) (prohibiting employment
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 4 (Law
Co-op. Supp. 1994) (same).

1612
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behalf of lesbians and gay men. 153 Thus, antigay ballot initiatives are
not intended to preclude affirmative action, since there is no affirmative action to preclude. Furthermore, even assuming that affirmative
action on behalf of lesbians and gay men were a realistic possibility in
the future, combatting affirmative action is not a plausible secular purpose for anti-gay-rights initiatives. If affirmative action were the real
target of a ballot initiative, then the initiative would simply ban affirmative action. As all of the proposed initiatives go substantially further
by precluding cities or states from ever adopting simple antidiscrimination legislation, the initiatives are wildly overinclusive to the
task of combatting affirmative action. Thus, more than opposition to
affirmative action is motivating the initiatives.
(2) The "Traditional Morality" Argument
Supporters of anti-gay-rights initiatives might also claim that they
want to preserve traditional secular morality, rather than have the
government endorse their religious beliefs. This argument has two
fundamental problems. First, when anti-gay-rights advocates openly
claim to be fighting on behalf of God' 54 and admit to using stealth
tactics to trick the public into adopting their viewpoint, 155 those advocates would be facetious if they claimed that their moral viewpoint
were not determined by and inseparable from their religious beliefs.
Second, any secular concept of traditional morality that includes viewing homosexuality as wrong cannot be divorced from religious opposition to homosexuality. 1 56 In light of the pervasive influence of
fundamentalist Christian organizations in the anti-gay-rights initiative
movement, maintaining that the initiative's backers are merely attempting to engraft secular morality onto the public conscience, rather
than attempting to endorse the religious beliefs of their financial sup153. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102.1(d) (West Supp. 1995) (stating explicitly that
the statute does not permit the use of affirmative action on the basis of sexual orientation).
154. See supra notes 133, 140.
155. See supra notes 138-39.
156. A strong argument can be made that any antigay initiative inherently violates the
Establishment Clause because of the impossibility of divorcing antigay sentiment from its
religious grounding:
The case of anti-lesbian/gay initiatives is, as a matter of principle, parallel [to that
of antisemitic initiatives]. A dissenting form of conscience, precisely on the
grounds of its moral independence and dissenting claims for justice, is branded
for that reason as heresy. The message is clear and clearly intended: persons
should convert from this form of conscience that is wholly unworthy of respect to
the only true religion of Americanism. The initiative is as much motored by sectarian religion and directed against dissenting conscience as the intolerably antisemitic initiative. Homosexuals are to late-twentieth century sectarians what the
Jews have traditionally been to sectarians in the Christian West throughout its
history: intolerable heretics to dominant religious orthodoxy.
Richards, supra note 25, at 531.
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porters, defies credulity. Perhaps some individuals voting for an antigay-rights initiative do not consider the religious implications of their
actions. An individual may not realize the connection between popular morality and traditional Christian belief. Yet, the initiative's sponsors cannot claim the same naivete. The Christian Right's attempt to
codify the view that homosexuality is sinful is part of a larger strategy
to import the tenets of traditional Christianity into secular law. In this
sense, the endorsement concept becomes more clear. Not only are
these groups attempting to have their religious beliefs regarding homosexuality endorsed, but they are using public antipathy to gay
rights as a way of galvanizing
support for the radical Christian Right's
57
agenda as a whole.'
From this perspective, the tremendous importance of the Establishment Clause argument, to both gay rights lawyers and courts considering these initiatives, is evident. Merely relying on equal
protection and free speech arguments is inadequate to meet the threat
of the Right's religious agenda. If our society truly wishes to maintain
the separation of church and state, the courts must recognize the
threat that the Religious Right's involvement in crafting law poses.
Religious organizations may participate in the public sphere, 158 but
when laws and governmental practices are motivated and financed
largely by people who want a state stamp of approval on their religious beliefs, the "wall of separation" between church and state loses
its meaning.
D. McGowan v. Maryland Overcome-The Initiatives Should be Struck
Down

In Part I.A, this Note argued that in order for a challenge to an
anti-gay-rights initiative under the Establishment Clause to succeed, it
would have to distinguish McGowan v. Maryland 59 and overcome the
rule that laws that merely coincide with religious belief are not unconstitutional for that reason alone. 60 The preceding discussion in Parts
ll.A-C demonstrates that anti-gay-rights initiatives do more than
merely coincide with the belief of some religions that homosexuality is
157. Meredith Tax, Banned by the Religious Right" My Censorship-And Ours, THE
NATION, Mar. 20, 1995, 374, 376 (noting that "homosexuality has become the new anathema of the religious right, replacing abortion"); Heather Rhoads, Cruel Crusade: The Holy
WarAgainst Lesbiansand Gays, Tan PROoRESSrVE, Mar. 1993, at 18 (describing the efforts
of the religious right to make "opposition to homosexuality the centerpiece of its national
agenda").
158. For a good discussion of the appropriate role of religion in public affairs, see Ruti
Teitel, A Critiqueof Religion As Politicsin the Public Sphere, 78 ConRN. L. Rav. 747,748
(1993).
159. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
160. Id. at 442.
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a sin and that sponsors and advocates are using their initiatives to
have government endorse their religious beliefs. Thus, unlike the
Sunday Closing law at issue in McGowan v. Maryland, anti-gay-rights
initiatives are being sponsored by present day religious forces and
hence bear the recent and continuing stamp of religious motivation.
Similarly, unlike the Sunday Closing law in McGowan, which was justified by the secular purpose of maintaining a uniform day of rest despite the law's religious origin, 16 1 no legitimate secular purpose for the
anti-gay-rights initiatives is plausible. Thus, McGowan v. Maryland is
not a barrier to finding that an anti-gay-rights initiative violates the
Establishment Clause.
In determining whether anti-gay-rights initiatives violate the Establishment Clause, one must also consider Justice O'Connor's argument that whether a law has the purpose of endorsing religion is
ultimately a legal question. 162 The lack of any rational secular motive,
combined with the very words of the sponsors and advocates of antigay-rights initiatives, indicates that the initiatives are impermissibly
motivated by religion. The quotations in Part II.B.3 show that those
advocating anti-gay-rights initiatives have a profound disrespect for
the separation of church and state, a professed desire to mislead the
public into believing that lesbians and gay men have special privileges,
and a penchant for invoking the "threat" that they perceive homosexuality poses to the nation's so-called "Judeo-Christian" culture. In
sum, courts should have ample evidence to strike down anti-gay-rights
initiatives under the Establishment Clause because, as a legal matter,
the initiatives are impermissibly motivated by religion.
In Everson, Justice Black explained that one fundamental purpose of the Establishment Clause was to prevent religious organizations from "openly or secretly" participating in the operation of state
and federal governments. 63 In a very real sense, failure to examine
the motivation behind an initiative enacted to endorse religious viewpoints allows religious organizations to become part of the governing
polity. If an initiative is struck down without reference to the Establishment Clause, the courts tell religious organizations that there is
nothing wrong with attempting to make society's laws, even if those
laws are motivated by religion.
The Establishment Clause, under the narrowest interpretation, is
aimed primarily at preventing the establishment of a national reli161. Id. at 434-35.
162. Thus, an appellate court sitting in review of a district court's decision whether an
anti-gay-rights initiative violated the Establishment Clause must conduct a de novo review
to determine whether the initiative was motivated by an intent to have government endorse a religious belief.
163. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
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gion. 164 While in colonial times, there was strong support for a national religion, today that is not a realistic possibility. Today the
danger is more subtle, but nonetheless real. If courts are complacent
in the face of laws motivated by religion, the coercive effects intrinsic
to an explicit national religion will arise from an implicitly recognized
national religion. Justice O'Connor designed her endorsement approach to avoid having the government send "a message to nonadherents [of religious beliefs] that they are outsiders . . . and an

accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored
members of the political community.' 65 Failure to subject policies
proposed by or largely supported by religious organizations to Establishment Clause analysis sends that message of approval, even if the
policy is ultimately struck down for reasons other than the Establishment Clause. Thus, inquiry into the purpose of anti-gay-rights initiatives is important for civil rights lawyers and courts; values protected
by the Establishment Clause must not be ignored.
HI.

Anti-Gay-Rights Initiatives Violate the Objective
Component of Establishment Clause Doctrine

A. The Objective Observer Standard
In this section, this Note analyzes the constitutionality of antigay-rights initiatives under the effects prong of the Lemon test, as reformulated by Justice O'Connor. The effects test has come to mean
that a governmental practice violates the Establishment Clause if an
objective observer would believe that the practice does "in fact convey[ ] a message of endorsement or disapproval" of religion.' 66 This
understanding of the Establishment Clause arose primarily in
Supreme Court cases concerning government-sponsored holiday displays, 67 and although federal appellate courts have applied the objective observer test in a variety of contexts, 68 whether courts would
164. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S.Ct. 2649, 2683 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
165. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
166. Id. at 690.
167. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 578 (1989) (involving a creche and
menorah display in downtown Pittsburgh); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 671-72 (involving a creche
display in a public park).
168. Circuit courts, however, have applied the objective observer test in public display
situations as well as in other contexts. See, e.g., Brown v. Woodland Joint Unified Sch.
Dist., 27 F.3d 1373, 1379-80 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that an objective observer would not
perceive that merely reading a school book discussing witches and witchcraft endorsed the
religion of witchcraft); Chabad-Lubavitch of Georgia v. Miller, 5 F.3d 1383, 1391 & n.11
(11th Cir. 1993) (applying the objective observer test to the public display of a menorah, a
primary symbol of the Jewish holiday of Chanukah); Berger v. Rensselaer Cent. Sch.
Corp., 98 F.2d 1160, 1162 (7th Cir. 1993) (prohibiting the distribution of Gideon Bibles in
the public schools); Americans United for Separation of Church and State v. City of Grand
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apply this approach to anti-gay-rights initiatives is still an open question. Regardless, courts should apply this standard in all contexts of
Establishment Clause jurisprudence because it is well-suited to protecting the values that the Establishment Clause promotes.
If the Establishment Clause is truly intended to erect "'a wall of
separation between church and state,' ' 169 then using the objective observer as a frame of reference for whether the government has endorsed religion makes sense. This is so because the government is
largely composed of nonobjective observers who have the same
Judeo-Christian heritage that the government is likely to endorse.
Thus, a policy may not look like an endorsement to someone who has
a religious belief in the policy, but may look like an endorsement to an
objective observer-one who sees the world both as a person who is
not religious at all and as a person who is a member of any religion.
Broadly applying the objective observer standard would help ensure
that Establishment Clause jurisprudence is not skewed because the
majority of Americans share a similar religious heritage.
B.

An Objective Observer Would Conclude that Anti-Gay-Rights
Initiatives Endorse Religion

Anti-gay-rights initiatives present a clear case in which an objective observer would conclude that the initiative does "in fact convey[ ]
a message of endorsement" of religion. 170 The majority of Americans
believe that the Bible condemns homosexuality. 171 In addition, many
religions oppose any form of lesbian and gay rights and consider homosexual behavior a sin. 172 Thus, an objective observer would immediately suspect that any antihomosexual laws are the product of
religious beliefs. The defenders of anti-gay-rights initiatives might respond with the McGowan rule-that anti-gay-rights initiatives merely
happen to coincide with commonly held religious beliefs. 73 However,
in McGowan, the Sunday Closing laws were not unconstitutional be74
cause the present day purpose of the laws was no longer religious.
Rapids, 980 F.2d 1538, 1539 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that a privately funded menorah display at a public forum does not violate the Establishment Clause); Doe v. Small, 934 F.2d
743, 746 (7th Cir. 1991) (refusing to allow the display of Christmas paintings in a public
park); Cammack v. Waihee, 932 F.2d 765, 779-80, 782 (9th Cir. 1991) (applying an "observer" standard to the question whether Hawaii's inclusion of Good Friday on the list of
public holidays offended the effects prong of the Lemon test).
169. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98
U.S. 145, 164 (1878)).
170. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690.
171.

RICHARD D. MOHR, GAYS/JUsTIcE: A STUDY OF ETHics, SociETY, AND LAW, 31-

34 (1988).
172. See supra note 109.
173. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 422 (1961).
174. Id. at 445.
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In other words, the Sunday Closing laws had a secular purpose that
rendered the original religious motivation inconsequential. 175 As Part
II demonstrates, however, an objective observer would not perceive a
nonreligious purpose for anti-gay-rights initiatives.
The question, therefore, under the objective observer reformulation of Lemon's effects test, is whether an anti-gay-rights initiative
would be perceived as endorsing the religious belief that it reflects. In
Allegheny v. ACLU, Justice Blackmun equates endorsement with favoritism or promotion of religion. 176 Endorsement is defined in popular parlance as the "act of endorsing, . . . giv[ing] approval to,
support[ing], [or] sanction[ing]." 177 Given the context in which antigay-rights initiatives arise, an objective observer would conclude that
the initiatives favor and approve of religion. When religious beliefs
become law without any rational secular justification, then the law favors and approves the religious belief.
A biased observer might conclude otherwise. Such an observer
might conclude that an anti-gay-rights initiative does not endorse religion, but really does prevent special rights for gays, or preserves some
independent notion of traditional morality. However, as demonstrated in Part II.C, no objective observer could reach those conclusions. Similarly, all the other supposedly nonreligious arguments that
lesbians and gay men do not deserve equal treatment under the law
rest on discriminatory and misinformed assumptions that have been
thoroughly discredited. 178 Thus, an objective observer would see that
the enforcement of an anti-gay-rights initiative effectively tells the
religious people and religious groups who sponsored the initiative that
their belief is an appropriate one and that the government now sanctions it with the force of law.
As a result, civil rights lawyers and courts are left in a somewhat
easier position than they would be without the effects prong of the
Lemon test. For even if the evidence does not clearly show that the
organizations sponsoring an initiative wanted governmental endorsement, the objective observer test allows courts to strike down laws
that objectively appear to endorse religious beliefs. Thus, even if a
court were persuaded that an anti-gay-rights law was truly enacted to
deny special rights or to preserve traditional morality, an objective
observer could only conclude that an anti-gay-rights initiative has the
practical effect of endorsing the traditional religious belief that homosexuality is sinful.
175. Id.
176. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 593 (1989).
177. WEBSTER'S NEw WORLD DIcrIoNARY 492 (David B. Guralnik ed., 1980).
178. See Mor, supra note 171, at 22-38 (debunking the myths that lesbians and gay
men are immoral, unnatural, child molesters, desirous of being the other gender, threatening to the well-being of a society, sick, sex-crazed, etc.).
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A consistent application of Justice O'Connor's objective observer
test for determining whether governmental policies violate the Establishment Clause would enable the courts to guard closely the barrier
between church and state. With the increasing power and sophistication of the radical Religious Right, 179 who is supporting a particular
policy and why it is being supported may not always be clear. The
180
Right often uses public unawareness to further its electoral ends.
Thus, even if courts strictly scrutinize the purpose of legislation, they
may not always be able to determine whether the true purpose is religious or nonreligious. In addition, evidence needed to make such a
determination may be difficult to obtain or may simply not exist. Ultimately, with a pure purpose analysis, the court is trying to figure out
what individuals are thinking-a task that can be quite difficult. The
objective observer test, however, does not depend on this type of evidence. If judges are willing to examine policies objectively and not let
their own religious beliefs affect their decisions, Justice O'Connor's
objective observer standard offers a powerful weapon against religious
encroachments into governmental policy.
Conclusion
At the conclusion of Part II, this Note suggests that a purpose
inquiry into laws that may be motivated by religion would have benefits beyond the sphere of lesbian and gay civil rights. Similarly, at the
conclusion of Part III, this Note suggests the theoretical benefits of
179. Tide Changes in Politics of Abortion: Debate Over Surgeon General Reflects Conservative Ascendancy, ARIz. REPUBLIC, Feb. 9, 1995, at A5 (analyzing the public reaction
to the nomination of Dr. Henry Foster, Jr.).
180. For example, candidates affiliated with the Religious Right often deliberately conceal their affiliation and avoid public appearances and debates, knowing that secrecy may
be their best route to electoral success. Tactical literature from Focus on the Family, a
religious political organization based in Colorado Springs, Colorado, advises candidates to
"[k]eep clergymen in the background.... Do not seek publicity." Rhoads, supra note 157.
A well-known example of the successful use of these tactics occurred in the 1990 San Diego elections, when 58 conservative Christian candidates won municipal elections. This
strategy has become known as the "San Diego Model." San Diego fundamentalist minister
Jay Grimstead commented: "It's not always the best idea to go down there with trumpets
blaring and flags waving.... So these people essentially did not announce loudly that they
were pro-life and pro-family-values." Id. But cf Gerry Braun, Conservative Christians
Shrug Off Their Losses, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Feb. 14, 1993, at Al (noting setbacks for
religious candidates since 1990). Robert Simonds of Citizens for Excellence in Education,
of Santa Ana, California, in his pamphlet, How to Elect Christiansto Public Office, advised
prospective candidates to avoid claiming to be a Christian who "believe[s] in traditional
values [and] teaching ... creationism." Rather he suggested simply claiming to run "because I love my children." As he put it, "[y]ou don't have to say it up front that you're a
Christian." Elizabeth Shogren & Douglas Frantz, School Boards Become the Religious
Right's New Pulpit, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1993, at Al. Shogren and Frantz note the widespread success that Christian candidates have had using these strategies. Id
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universally applying Justice O'Connor's objective observer standard in
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. The most immediate benefit of
striking down anti-gay-rights initiatives, however, would be to individual lesbians and gay men. Anti-gay-rights initiatives, when successful,
have the very real effect of precluding lesbians, gay men, and bisexual
people from lobbying the legislature for antidiscrimination laws. 81 In
addition, the initiatives allow employers to fire people simply because
they are not heterosexual and to refuse to rent an apartment for the
same reason. In a greater sense, these initiatives single out lesbians,
gay men, and bisexual individuals as undeserving of the same respect
that other members of society view as routine.
What makes the anti-gay-rights initiatives even more appalling is
that they are not based on any rational policy objective. Rather, they
are motivated by an historic antipathy toward lesbians and gay men
and by religious condemnation of homosexuality. Many fundamentalist Christians view gay rights as a threat to Judeo-Christian values.
Thus, organizations associated with fundamentalist Christianity have
adopted a strategy that they hope will disarm the perceived threat
and, at the same time, galvanize popular support for their entire religious agenda. To truly counter this threat, gay rights advocates should
expose the anti-gay-rights initiatives for what they are-attempts to
have government endorse a religious viewpoint. Some fundamentalist
organizers deliberately attempt to conceal the purpose of the laws
they support and the affiliation of candidates they endorse for public
office. They know that if their true motivations and affiliations are
exposed, they risk quickly losing popular support in a country that
largely supports a division between religion and politics. Thus, pointing out the religious motivation for anti-gay-rights initiatives will help
focus the public's attention on what is truly at stake in the battle over
anti-gay-rights initiatives-as Urvashi Vaid, the former director of the
National Gay and Lesbian task force, put it, a battle between democracy and theocracy. 182
It is important, therefore, for lesbian and gay rights advocates to
argue that anti-gay-rights initiatives violate the Establishment Clause.
As this Note has argued, there are strong factual and theoretical reasons why this argument should be successful in the courts. However,
the argument that anti-gay-rights initiatives are motivated by a desire
to have government endorse a religious belief need not be limited to
presentation before the courts. Lesbian and gay rights advocates
should attack the religious motivation behind anti-gay-rights initiatives in state legislatures and in the media. Court battles are not always successful, and the role of the courts in effecting social change is
181. Burke, supra note 24.
182. See supra note 114.
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not a closed question. 183 Ultimately, lesbians and gay men desire not
only legal change, but a change in societal attitudes as well. Pointing
out that the organized opposition to gay rights is motivated by religious dogma should help society see that the argument that gays are
immoral is not based on any factual predicate but on a particularly
resilient strain of religious-based prejudice. If that prejudice were exposed and defeated, lesbians and gay men would not only be able to
obtain legal protection from discrimination, but also societal recognition that being gay is not a morally unworthy "lifestyle," but a profoundly beautiful part of life.

183. See GERALD ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE 339 (1991) (arguing that court victories for social movements divert the movements' attention away from more productive
avenues for social change). But see Marc Rubinstein, Cause Lawyering, Social Change &
the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual Movement An AnthropologicalSurvey, May 1994 (unpublished
manuscript on file with the author) (finding that lesbian and gay activists and lawyers often
recognize the limits of court-based solutions and, thus, use the courts wisely).

